My Commentary on Loss of The Oceangate Submersible

The Oceangate-Owned Submersible "Titan"
The Oceangate-Owned Submersible “Titan”

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

Unless you’re lucky enough to avoid news in general, you’re already aware of last month’s global-crisis-level unforced error, in which five people died on a rickety submersible that imploded while diving to visit the wreck of Titanic.

As a former submarine sailor this event strikes pretty close to home. This loss didn’t need to happen. It did happen as a result of unchecked arrogance on the part of the corporate owners and engineers who built the damn thing knowing full well it wasn’t safe. But they did it anyway, for reasons that had no relationship to sound engineering and concern for passenger safety.

My Quora Commentary

I’ve been struggling to express my thoughts on the loss of the OceanGate submersible “Titan.” I finally was able to give some voice to my feelings in answering a Quora question; ” Do you believe what happened to the submarine last month was an accident? My answer touches on my feelings, although nowhere as complete as I wish.

Yes, what happened to the OceanQuest submersible was an accident, in the same way the Titanic sinking and Space Shuttle Challenger blowing up mid-air were accidents. In each case, the accident occured after an entirely preventable series of actions by people in positions of leadership who allowed their excessive pride, over-inflated self-confidence, and arrogance (otherwise known as hubris) dictate their decisions.

So, in the case of the RMS Titanic, we have the Titanic’s Captain, Edward J. Smith, making statements such as: “I cannot imagine any condition which would cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that.” Or, the Vice-President of the White Star Line in New York stating, “We place absolute confidence in the Titanic. We believe that the boat is unsinkable.” Which in turn led to Captain Smith increasing ship’s speed on a moonless night while in a known area of icebergs.

We know how that turned out.

Then, we had the Space Shuttle Challenger blow up in mid-air with the entire world watching, with the first civilian selected to travel into space embarked. Bob Ebeling was one of five booster rocket engineers at NASA contractor Morton Thiokol who tried to stop the 1986 Challenger launch. The engineers worried that cold temperatures overnight — the forecast said 18 degrees — would stiffen the rubber O-ring seals that prevented burning rocket fuel from leaking out of booster joints. When they brought their information to leadership, Lawrence Mulloy of NASA’s Marshall Spaceflight Center responded with “When do you want me to launch? Next April?”

Once again, we know how that turned out.

So now we have Stockton Rush, a Princeton graduate holding a degree in aeronautical engineering. He decided to create for-profit deep sea sightseeing using submersibles that “reinvented” the engineering knowledge on building these craft. The OceanGate website noted as far back as 2011 that “since 1974, there has not been a serious injury or fatality on an ABS certified passenger submersible.” During an address before The Explorers Club in 2017, Rush called submersibles “the safest vehicles on the planet”. In 2019 Rush expressed the view that the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993 “needlessly prioritized passenger safety over commercial innovation.”

In building the Titan, Rush, pushed back on safety regulations saying they “stifled innovation” and that “At some point, safety just is pure waste. I mean, if you just want to be safe, don’t get out of bed. Don’t get in your car. Don’t do anything.”

So, he used second-rate materials in an application they had never been tested for. He hired interns and entry-level engineers to design the submersible Titan instead of experienced people. He not only ignored multiple deep submersible experts telling him he was putting the lives of future passengers in danger, he fired his own safety engineer when that engineer produced a report detailing multiple flaws in his design. He created legal liability shields to avoid certification and licensing requirements for passenger-carrying vessels. Then he made public claims his vessel was in fact certified and met all legal requirements.

We know how that turned out.

Yes, the implosion of the OceanQuest submersible Titan was an accident. but it was an entirely preventable accident, caused by the hubris of Stockton Rush. I’m not the first person to comment that the Titan imploded due to hubris of it’s builder, while attempting to sightsee on the wreckage of a ship that sank due to the hubris of it’s builders.

Quora Answer

My Follow-on Commentary

I am a former US Navy submarine sailor. I qualified in submarines on the nuclear fast attack submarine USS Scamp (SSN 588) all the way back in 1976. Although my qualification board was forty-seven years ago, I retain membership in the highly exclusive community of submarine veterans.

Submarine Qualifications

I served on two submarines in my Navy career and earned my submarine crewmember insignia. To earn the right to wear the Submarine Insignia as a crew member, I spent nine months in study and reviews. I memorized every ship’s system onboard Scamp, learned how they worked, and in some cases learned how to operate them.

My months of study cumulated in a “walk-through,” where I walked from one end of the boat to the other, with my division officer, pointing out every significant valve, electrical fitting, and piece of machinery. Then, I sat for a four-hour oral board in front of senior crew members, answering their questions and drawing system schematics from memory. At the age of 20, before my college-bound high school classmates had diplomas, I was qualified as crewmember on a nuclear fast-attack submarine.

I later qualified in deep submergence vehicles as crew member of the deep-diving submarine USS Dolphin (AGSS 555). At the time the Dolphin was world’s deepest-diving submarine.

Submarine Standards

Submarines are built to quality assurance standards unheard of in almost any other industry. These standards are unimaginably expensive. But the cost of not building to these standards is even higher. In April 1963 we lost the brand-new nuclear-powered submarine USS Thresher (SSN 593) with 130 people onboard. The cause was later determined to be faulty construction. As a result, the Navy created the SUBSAFE program which has governed design, construction, and maintenance of all Navy submarines. We haven’t lost a sub due to faulty construction since SUBSAFE was implemented.

Submarine standards are not just applied in construction. Safety, training, and quality assurance procedures governing maintenance was an everyday part of life onboard a submarine. During my submarine tours, I lived, slept, breathed, safety. Training was a daily event. Our maintenance planning requirements were extensive. Typically, to perform a maintenance task, it took far longer to work through the checklist of safety requirements and procedures than it did to perform the actual task.

I was reminded every single day onboard a submarine that my actions safeguarded the lives of me and my shipmates. Yes, all this was a tremendous burden. But that was the burden we all accepted. Because we knew our lives depended on following safety procedures, constant training, and following established maintenance procedures.

It’s because we consistently apply these high standards of construction, safety, training, and maintenance that submarines (and submersibles) are “the safest vehicles on the planet.”


When I started hearing news on the probable loss of the deep-sea submersible Titan, owned by OceanGate and piloted by CEO Stockton Rush, I was first horrified. Then, I read about the physical construction of the submersible. I read about OceanGate’s lack of construction standards, their contempt for safety and certification standards, and the way Rush ignored all submersible experts trying to help him. The more I read the more I felt shocked, then angry. My anger has only increased with more news of the submersibles’ construction, and more news about Stockton Rush himself.

My Bottom Line

I see that Stockton Rush was more interested in wealth and fame than building something of value. His recorded statements mocking submarine safety grate on me like fingernails on a blackboard. His contempt for the standards every member of my submarine community hold dear cost him his life, and the lives of his four paying passengers.

Qualifying in submarines is a very large piece of the person I am today. Stockton Rush was thumbing his nose at the standards I once lived. He was mocking the standards my submarine community has spent so much sweat and blood to develop. I don’t feel sorry for him. In fact, I truly hope he had at least a few seconds of warning before the sub imploded on him. Enough time to realize just how badly he screwed up.


These are references available at the time of publishing this post on the OceanGate submersible Titan and Stockton Rush.

Related Posts


July 6, 2023: A revised version of this story was posted on my Daily Kos diary at: “My Submariner’s View on Loss of the OceanGate Submersible.

July 6, 2023: A commenter on my Daily Kos post pointed to this YouTube video of alleged transcripts with analysis, between the Titan and surface support vessel, up until the moment comms were lost. Very chilling, and insightful. If this transcript is true, then the pilot and passengers had about 19 minutes to know that something bad was happening. Also indicates they may have had buoyancy problems from the very start of their final descent.

LEAKED Titan Sub Transcript Shows Crew In Battle For Lives
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